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Anthropology, law and genetic inheritance
E. ADAMSON HOEBEL
2273 Folwell Street, St. Paul, MN 55/08, USA
Although anthropology has accepted organic evolution as established fact for
more than a century, anthropologists have made few serious attempts to anchor
human institutions in the specific social behavior of animal aggregations.
Throughout the first half of this century, American and
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British social and cultural anthropologists with few exceptions rejected cultural
evolutionary theory in favor of structural-functional study of directly
observable societies. Contemporary anthropologists tend to reject or downgrade
the significance of panhuman genetic factors in favor of the dogma of culture as
sui generis. However, law as a phenomenon of social structure can probably be
linked fruitfully to behavioral research with genetic implications—with
cautious stretching of the limits of naivety, through examination of the socalled imperatives of social maintenance, and the 'law jobs'.
In approaching the problem of whether the ordering of social behavior in human
populations may in part be rooted in our genetic inheritance, we accept as
established fact that all human beings are basically the product of organic evolution.
We acknowledge with Dobzhansky (1962:115) that 'many features of human
ontogeny make no sense at all except on the assumption that they are retentions of
developmental patterns of remote ancestors. This is clear enough and has been
accepted by anthropologists for more than a century-but only with respect to
anatomy and certain physiological processes.
In the early years of post-Darwinian enthusiasm, Western anthropologists such as
Tylor, Lubbock, Frazer, Westermarck, Bachofen and Morgan built theoretical
systems of social and cultural evolution enunciating developmental sequences for
the emergence of human subsistence techniques, mating, kinship, property,
government and religion. In a more modest way, Sir Henry Maine did the same for
the evolution of law. In no instance, however, was any serious attempt made to
anchor human institutions in the specific social behavior of animal aggregations,
although hypothetical assumptions concerning prehistoric forms of mating, kinship
and 'horde' organization were advanced.
Early in the present century, as ethnology became self-consciously empirical,
anthropologists, except archaeologists, became increasingly, hostile to theories of
cultural evolution. In the United States, Robert Lowie (1920:107) proclaimed, 'There
is no royal road to the comprehension of cultural phenomena and painstakingly
demonstrated that the social history of a particular people cannot be reconstructed
from any generally valid scheme of evolution but only in the light of its known and
probably cultural relations with neighboring peoples’. Morgan's and Frazer's
deductive interpretations of the sororate and levirate forms of marriage as cultural
relics of group marriage were dismissed as 'empty guesses, which may be
disregarded. They are real
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institutions intelligible in their context; they are not rendered one ~ whit more
intelligible by conceiving of them as a survival of a condition which has never been
observed' (Lowie, 1920: 185).
From 1910 to 1930 American anthropology limited itself to intensive ethnographic
work in field studies and in limited historical reconstructions of culture growth
among Indian tribes. In Britain, both Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown rejected
cultural evolution and historical reconstruction as scientifically bootless because
they dealt with empirically unverifiable data. Radcliffe-Brown turned British, and
part of American, social anthropology into a search for regularities ~ in social
structure based largely on Durkheim's proposition that social reality is external and
sui genens, and that behavior and personality are the product of individual
internalization of the consscience collective the cultural ordering of norms and
values. Although Radcliffe-Brown acknowledged both organic and social
evolution, in practice he evinced no interest in either, holding that social
anthropology is concerned only with persons in reciprocal relations based on
mutual interests and values socially determined.
In sum, social anthropologists in the United States and England, except for
Malinowski's naive and highly generalized use of bio-genetic 'needs' and 'drives' as
culture-generating forces, tended to restrict their researches to social structure and
social facts. They either dogmatically reject the possible significance of panhuman
genetic factors or more modestly assume that the question is one of such low priority
in research strategies that it is better for them not to devote limited energies and
resources to pursuit of the question.
The logical foundations of this position have been spelled out in a symposium
volume, Closed Systems and Open Minds: the Limits of Naivity in Social
Anthropology {1964) edited by Max Gluckman. It deals with two issues of
importance to our fundamental problem here: can the assumptions and findings of
biophysical behavioral research on the one hand and those of the sociology and
anthropology of law on the other, be fruitfully linked? These two issues are (1)
limiting one's field of study and (2) making naive assumptions outside one's
special field. He identifies five procedures used in scholarly formulations of
comprehensive endeavors: incorporating complex facts without analysis;
circumscribing a field; abridging the conclusions of other sciences; making naive
assumptions about aspects of reality other than those under investigation; and
simplifying events within the field of investigation (Gluckman, 1964: 17).
We all do these things. Only by narrowing the field of inquiry can
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we achieve expertise and advance empirical knowledge of reality. We all
incorporate certain facts as given-an anthropologist will accept the fact of a rain
forest as a tribal habitat without attempting a meterological explanation of it. We
abridge the findings of atmospheric—and astrophysics when we attempt to deal with
important long range climatic cycles in the Pleistocene era. We assume a need for
individual identity, which is outside the area of our competence. And of course we
simplify the facts within our field of investigation-any ethnographic report is a more
or less generalized construct of what is going on in tribal society.
The problem is; how tightly can we maintain our closed systems if without
stultifying development of a grand theory of human beings, and how much openness
and naivete can we accept in cross-disciplincary incorporation without muddying
our perceptions with dubious trash?
Sociobiology is in bad repute. Setting aside widespread emotional prejudice
emanating from political bias, repugnance to sociobiology" rests on its proclivity
to reject circumscription of its field while making , innumerable assumptions about
aspects of reality outside the fields of biology and ethology of insects and lower
orders of animals. Worse, it excessively simplifies organic phenomena within, its
own field.
Lumsden & Wilson’s recent volume (1981) strives to rectify this last failing and
they have made some progress in linking genes and culture. However, Washburn,
one of our most innovative physical anthropologists and a pioneer in studies of
primate behavior, warns that modern genetics is radically different from the kind
described by Wilson (1978) and that sociobiology omits any reference to the
complications of modern evolutionary theory. We are told that over the past 20
years molecular biology has revolutionized evolutionary theory. Dobzhansky et al.
(1977: 156) state that recent research shows a seeming deluge of genetic
variability' that 'proves the classical theory is clearly invalid', and that
determination of the relative importance of selection and chance or neutral facts
stands as 'the most important unsolved[emphasis added problem in our
understanding of the mechanisms that bring about 'biological evolution'. Yet
Chagnon and Irons's Evolutionary biology and Human Social behavior (1979) in
Washburn's view rests on 'the synthetic theory of the 1940s plus inclusive fitness',
while its 78 pages of bibliography contain 'almost no ~ references to even the most
important developments in evolutionary theory (Washburn, 1982).
We must tread cautiously, for few anthropologists (including this
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author) know anything about contemporary scientific evolutionary theory.
Although Stent (1980: 4-10) devotes respectful attention to social anthropologist
Sahlins' polemic attack on sociobiology, physical anthropologist Konner (who
does know the field) dismisses Sahlins' critique on the ground that 'his grasp of the
basic scientific issues is so poor that discussion of his critique is really impossible'
(Konner , ~ 1982).
It is imperative that we all recognize and respect the limits of our naivete.
Now, can law fruitfully be linked to behavioral research with genetic implications?
I would say: only with a cautious stretching of the limits of naivete. This, I, for one,
am willing to do with open interest and limited expectations.
Much has been achieved in behavioral science research in comparative
jurisprudence in the last five decades. 'Law is one of the best-studied subdisciplines
of anthropology; the literature is small but of high quality' (Bohannan, 1963: 284). It
has a strong empirical base ,"7 emerging from a series of carefully executed field
studies of a variety of .,~; tribal systems in North and Central America, Africa, and
Oceania, ranging from simple to complex in subsistence economy and social
organization. It has a common approach rooted in the so-called trouble case
method—the observation and recording of issues of dispute and conflict, and how
they are perceived, conceived and resolved by the members of a given society. It has
at the same time generated considerable healthy dispute among its theoreticians over
such questions as to how law may best be conceived and identified, to what extent it
is a real phenomenon in its own right or a mental construct of the observing analyst.
The criteria for identification of law-the nature of norms, dispute handling processes,
sanctions, authority and levels of hierarchy within a social system to which any fj
body of law may apply-have effects that differentially narrow or broaden the domain
of law, according to the preferences of the researcher.
Here I offer a compact abridgement of my own views of what legal anthropology
has to offer on the nature and function of law in human societies and the degree to
which it may be rooted in the organic nature of man and subhuman species. Law is
a cultural phenomenon that cannot be studied apart from the entire social entity of
which it is a part. Law is a human invention developed as an adaptive mechanism
for the maintenance (effective survival) of the individuals, subgroups and the entity
that constitute a society. It is that aspect of social
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structure that serves to standardize behavior and to regulate relations between
individuals and groups. It can be focused on as a loosely discrete phenomenon but
never to the neglect of its cultural matrix and never without linkage to all other
aspects of the productive and social system of which it is but a small part.
Its attributes, for purpose of identification are:
(1) Regularity, Law consists of social norms identified a modal behavior
characteristics ill defined situations. Regularity IS rarely absolute; behavior is
variable around a clustered mode, and most legal systems make allowance for
'permissible leeway'. Regularity introduces the element of predictability.
(2) Sanction. All social norms are sanctioned. Conformance evokes rewarding
(positive) responses, internal and/or social; deviance evokes punishing (negative)
social and, perhaps, internal individual responses. Legal norms are sanctioned by
the forceful application of physical injury or the confiscation of material '0'0 ~
goods-restitution or the payment of damages or fines.
(3) Legitimate ('official') authority. The legal process is initiated and carried
through by either the wronged person and members of his subgroup or by
designated officials (headmen, chiefs, priests, judges, councils) explicitly
representing the societal interest as a whole. Due process means that the
procedures used are socially recognized and accepted as right and proper and that
the sanctions are appropriate and acceptable.
There are indeed functional prerequisites for survival: organically and genetically
determined and culturally conditioned for the individual human organism.,
culturally adapted in the main for human populations as societies. Whether there
are genome presets that underlie a few cultural adaptations remains an open
question. Certainly, biology imposes limitations on what may be culturally
achieved; more than that, it mechanically controls much of the essentially organic
.0.." field of individual behavior (neurological, metabolic, reproductive etc.).
A socio-anthropological formulation of the functional prerequisites for societal
maintenance, which builds on the earlier work of Malinowski and Talcott Parsons,
sets out the following:
(1) to maintain the biologic functioning of the group members;
(2) to reproduce new members of the group;
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(3) to socialize new members into functioning adults;
(4) to produce and distribute goods and services necessary to life;
(5) to maintain order within the group and between it and outsiders;
(6) to define the 'meaning of life' and maintain the motivation to survive and engage
in the activities necessary for survival, (Bennett & Tumin, 1948),
Legal institutions are directed to function (5) above. Four specific maintenance tasks
of law may be identified.
(1) To define relationships among the members of a society, to identify what
activities are permitted and what are ruled out, so as to maintain at least minimal
integration between the activities of individuals and groups within the society: the
ordering of the fundamentals of living together.
(2) To allocate authority and determine who may legitimately exercise physical
coercion as a socially exercised privilege/ right-and how. This point is derived from
the necessity of channeling aggression, of taming naked force and directing ~ force
to the maintenance of order within the social system.
(3) To dispose of trouble cases as they arise; to heal social breaches when breaches
of defined relations are alleged to have occurred.
(4) Explicitly, to redefine relations between individuals and groups as the conditions
of life change; to maintain adaptability.
The specific substantive contents of primitive law systems have been found to be
highly variable in accordance with the numerous manifestations of social structure
around the world. But they are not infinite. Social evolutionism is once again in
vogue among American anthropologists. As for myself, I have long held that it can
be r, discerned in broad and general terms in the area of law (Hoebel, 1954: ~
Chapter 12). I believe that the postulate of coevolution in organic and cultural
development holds good. How much of social ordering is genetically predicted for
human beings is no moot question. My mind is open to the search for epigenetic
patterns in the multifarious formation of legal culturgens, but let us not each in our
separate disciplines fail to hold a tight rein on our respective limits of naivete.

